

1. Brit. and Ireland - Anne, Queen

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LETTER
TO THE
EXAMINER,
Concerning the
Barrier-Treaty
VINDICATED.



L O N D O N,

Printed for John Morphew, near Stationers-Hall, 1713. Price 4d.

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LETTER TO THE Examiner, &c.

SIR,

THIS elaborate Treatise of, *The Barrier Treaty vindicated*, tho' I had daily heard it commended and extolled by the *W--gs* for a Nonsuch and Unanswerable, had neither provoked either my Curiosity or Spleen so much as to give it a Reading, 'till I found you thought it a Subject worthy your Examinations; for the Praises of the *W--gs* (especially since I hear poor Duke *Hamilton*'s Murder not only excused, but commended by them, and the Actor of it made the second Hero of their Toast, after his Grace who advised it) move me no more than their Railings and Lies do: I endeavour to hear all with an absolute Indifference; but indeed their Actions and Productions of late, have favoured

so strong of Inhumanity or Folly, as must beget in every honest Man either an utter Hatred or Contempt of them.

I shall endeavour to confine my self in this Letter, to the Consideration of this Vindicator of the *Barrier Treaty*, and his Performance: As to the Person, I am very far from believing him to be a certain Great Man, under whose Umbrage they at first endeavoured to usher it into the World; he always, whilst he could write, wrote better; but from the fluency of Words, the fallacy in his Reasonings, and his bidding at All, and often overshooting himself, I guess he may be at least a Cousin German to one *Bob Hush*, who has lately obliged the World with just such another Performance: As to the Book, I must own 'tis amazing to me to hear the *Party* cry up such an egregious Piece of Sophistry for undeniable Reasoning, and bid Defiance to an Answer, when I dare affirm, that throughout the Whole, there is scarce one Argument wherein the Question is not either begg'd, false stated, or evaded; and though I think it not at all difficult to prove what I have just now asserted; yet, Sir, I should never have thought of undertaking or touching upon a Province, which you have already, in so masterly a way, with so much superior Sense, Wit and Vivacity, so thoroughly executed, but that I hear the *Whigs* (whose chief Virtue is Obstinacy, and Strength lies in not yielding) yet daily contending that your very Ingenious Papers are no Answer: They artfully allow what is impossible to be deny'd, a vast deal of Wit, a happy Genius that is able to expose and turn the best Performances into Ridicule, but will still insist upon them to be no Answer, because you

you have not gravely pursu'd the Author, and attack'd him in the same form and method of Reasoning, which he has laid down to himself; therefore if you will admit of a lower Genius to intermeddle with a Work already so well done, I will have the Patience to go along with this artful Gentleman Pace by Pace, and consider every one of his Arguments in the same Form he himself has laid them down; and I doubt not but I shall shew his whole Book, from beginning to end, to be one continued piece of what we used to call *Dog-Logick*, wherein his *Postulata* are always either foreign to the Question, or not true; or when the Fact is true, 'tis falsely concluded upon.

And of the first Sort is his Introduction, which begins with as specious a formal Cant, as *Alexander Bendo's* Speech, and the Whole of it is to the same purpose, to Amuse and Deceive, and not to Instruct, or be of any Service to his Country: He sets out, "P. 1. The securing the P——t S——n as limitted by Parliament, and the providing a sufficient Barrier in the *Netherlands* against the *Encroachments* of France, are Points so absolutely necessary for the Preservation of the Religion and Liberty of every *British* Subject, that he is very much surprized that a Treaty made, for securing to the Nation such invaluable Blessings, should, &c. And p. 2. ' He thinks it strange it should be thought a diminution of the Crown of Great Britain, to strengthen it self with a Foreign Alliance, against the opposition of a Foreign Enemy'. By which, and all the rest of his Introduction, he would fain insinuate into the Reader, that the whole ground of Complaint against this Treaty, is, only because by

it is stipulated a Guarranty for the P____t S____n, and a Barrier for the Dutch against France: Whereas he, and the Father of all Lies and false Insinuations very well know, that the just Indignation which every honest Briton has conceived against this Treaty is, not from its stipulating a Guarranty for the Succession, and a Barrier for the Dutch against France, but for its being made *under Colour of That*, a real Invitation, or rather Obligation, that a Foreign Force (under the Pretence of Friendship) shall come over hither to support the Faction and overthrow our Constitution, whenever any of them, even the *Observator* or *Flying-Post* shall think fit to blow the Trumpet, by asserting there is a Sedition or Conspiracy fomenting here against the House of H____r. This is the true Charge that is justly laid against this Treaty. The Words of the 2d Article are, ' If any Person, State or Power whatsoever (France is so far from being particularly meant, that 'tis not expressly named at all) shall (but so much as) pretend to oppose the said Succession in the House of Hannover, either directly or indirectly, by open War, or by fomenting Seditions or Conspiracies against it, that then the States shall maintain and support it. What Latitude is here given for the Dutch to come over with a Foreign Force of Forty, Fifty, or Sixty thousand Men, almost at their own Will and Pleasure? And what numberless Mischiefs would be the certain Consequence of a Foreign Army's ever getting Footing here, 'tis needless to describe? All Men must be sensible of them, even Women and Children want not, by fatal Experience, to learn them. But you have drawn so very lively and pathetical a Sketch of them in your *Examiner* of December the

the 11th, that, for the Entertainment of the Reader of these duller Sheets, I cannot help inserting part of it. Let him 'Imagine then Great Britain, upon their *Invitation*, swarming with an Host of *foreign Guarantees*, the whole Rabble of Europe, like Egyptian Locusts, covering our Country, more zealous for Plunder than Religion, Germans, Dutchmen, Prussians, Savoyards, nay, Turks, Muscovites and Barbarians, (for none of them are excluded by this Treaty); and what a Scene of Confusion and Horror must then be display'd in the midst of two goodly Islands? The Eruption of the Northern Hive, the Ravages of the Goths and Vandals, would make but a faint Image of our Calamities. There would be then no need of a general Naturalization, unless for *Britons* only; we might then have many Successions to secure, and our Monarchy parcelled out into more Divisions than prevailed at the Heptarchy; Liberty would consist in the Choice of Tyrants, and Religion in the number of our Gods. They who *delighted in War*, might then have their fill of Blood; and they who are given to Change, be tired with *Revolutions*, &c. Who can read this, and bring the Images, so justly Painted here before his Eyes, and not entertain this Treaty with the utmost Abhorrence and Detestation? Nay, there is a sort of tacit Consent in the Vindicator himself, and that this Part of the Treaty is entirely unjustifiable; for, to do Justice to his *Modesty*, he has not offer'd throughout his whole Book, one single word in Defence of it, but cunningly shuffles off his Reader with a Story of a *Foreign Alliance* against a *Foreign Enemy*, and a *Defensive League* against France; whereas the very Words of the Counter-Project

of the Treaty undeniably prove, That a Guar-
ranty for the Succession, or Barrier *against France*,
were far from being the principal Ends or In-
tentions of the Advisers of it; for whenever
Her Majesty from Her innate Wisdom, or some
Lord of the Council honester than others, in
forming the Seventh Article, had inserted, *in
case of an open War with France*, the Treaty-
makers on t'other side the Water, disclaiming
then even that Pretence, unluckily struck out
those very Words *with France*, whereon the Vin-
dicator hangs his whole Defence of them. So
that I appeal to the Vindication it self, whether
the true Charge against this Treaty, of inviting
a Foreign Host to come out and Devour us al-
most at their own Will and Pleasure, be not
wholly evaded; and to the Words of the Coun-
ter-Project, whether his Assertion of its being in-
tended only for a *Defensive Alliance against France*,
be not *false in Fact*; and, to any Impartial Rea-
der, whether allowing his *Postulatum* to be true,
that a Foreign Alliance may be both reasonable
and necessary, *against a Foreign Enemy*, it is not
foreign to the Objections made against this Treaty.

So that, in truth, the whole first Part of his
Book is already Answered; but that his Friends
may complain no more of his being Answered
by Wholesale, as they are pleased to term it, I
will, as I promised above, take a Review of
every one of his Arguments in particular, and
imagine my self now got no further, than to
Page the 4th, wherein he tells us, *The Danger of
a Popish Succession is acknowledged by the Jacobites
themselves*: What Consequences he can draw
from all this in support of his Treaty, I know
not; but I take it to be, as no doubt it was
meant, only flinging Dust into his Reader's Eyes,

in hopes to blind some, and by the help of the Hackney-Bugbear Words, *Popery* and *Pretender*, to frighten others from looking into those black *Designs*, which he must cast a *Mist* before. However, I think this just Observation may be made from them, That whilst the *Jacobites*, those Bigots in Loyalty, set some Bounds to their Desires of having what they call their Rightful King restor'd, and would be unwilling, even in his Opinion, to sacrifice their *Religion* to what they call *Justice*; these Treaty-makers break through all, and readily sacrifice their *Country* to the carrying on their own *Vile Designs*, which at the bottom are for *no King* at all.

But to go on, his next Position is, Page the 6th, That the *P——t S——n*, in its present Circumstances, cannot be effectually secured but by a *Foreign Alliance*. Sir, you were pleased, for Brevity sake, to admit this; but since you allowed at the same time the direct contrary might be proved, I shall chuse rather to Examin into the Truth of this Doctrine, than implicitly Acquiesce in it, only because 'tis so peremptorily advanc'd. In the first Place then, every Body must allow that the *P——t S——n* is not a little secured by a great many vigorous Laws made in the Defence of it, 'tis made High Treason to oppose it, or so much as conspire against it; which is the same Security Her Majesty has for Her *Crown*; and every Body knows that those Laws, and the Inclinations and Affections of the People, are the very *Foundation* on which it had its first *Establishment*, and by which it must be maintain'd; so that the endeavouring to give it a foreign Support, is but carrying on the Building beyond what its natural Foundations will bear, which at best is but bungling Architecture.

B and

and may perhaps overset the whole Fabrick. Alteratives in Physick are seldom so nauseous, but a crasie Constitution may be glad to make use of them ; but if a Potion was to be drench'd down our Throats by force, I am much mistaken if it would ever set easie upon *British* Stomachs : A Foreign Prince, tho' a Stranger to our Laws and Constitution, as much as his present Subjects are to *British* Liberty, may, by being of a Protestant Religion, if he will slide in easily among us, be set in a fair Light towards the People ; but if a Foreign Prince is to come surrounded with an Army to seize the Crown by force, he will appear so terrible, he will frighten the People from ever looking towards such a Successor. So that a *Foreign Alliance*, if throughly consider'd, *instead of being necessary*, may very possibly create a greater Prejudice than Advantage to the P——t S——n ; and indeed, let it be consider'd which way you will, very ill Consequences will probably attend it, either in regard to the Prince or People. If it is meant only to Awe the People, Force and Restraint upon the Affections is unnatural and impracticable, and always rather creates an Aversion than a good Esteem towards the Person that imposes it ; and if it is intended in earnest to fix the *British* Crown upon any Prince's Head whatever by the Power of a Foreign Army, from that minute, whenever that shall be done, we may pronounce a solemn and dismal Adieu to the Liberties of *Britain*.

So that this Position, of a *Foreign Alliance being necessary*, I can by no means admit to be *true*, notwithstanding in Aid of it, Page the 7th, he urges that there is a Pretender in *France*, and that he is very positive and certain the King

King of France will never desert his Interest, and always afford him his utmost Assistance; with abundance more of such sort of Stuff: for the Veracity of All which, he entirely pins his Faith upon a common Sixpenny Pamphlet, (perhaps the Produce of Grubstreet, or, for ought I know, of his own Closet) called *The Memoirs of the Chevalier St. George*. However, knowing nothing at all of that doughty Author, I shall not spend any time in Cavelling how much or little he is to be Credited, but rather admit all he says to be true, and consider it in its full force. Taking it for granted then, That the King of France did betwixt Eleven and Twelve Years ago, when he himself was but Sixty odd Years of Age, then in a full tide of Prosperity, his Armies flush'd with constant Victory, his Family full of Young Princes ready to step in and fill his Throne, if an unexpected Death should take him off, did promise a young pretended Prince, exiled from his Country on account of his Religion, that he would always give him his Assistance, and never desert his Interests; is not the Case, since this Promise made, quite alter'd with the King of France himself? Instead of Sixty odd, he is now approaching to Fourscore Years old, batter'd with a constant Train of ill Successes; his Veteran Troops destroy'd, and his Crown, whenever he drops off, descending upon the Head of an Infant. Consider him, with all these Circumstances, promising in the most solemn manner a Potent Queen, lawfully in Possession of Her Throne, and the Affections of Her People, that he will never, in favour of Her pretended Brother, endeavour to disturb Her, or the Succession after Her, as limited by Law. Which of these Promises, in common

Sense, are we to believe he'll keep, or be afraid he'll break? I am not, like the Vindicator, for making his Promises to the one Sacred, and his Oaths to t'other Perjuries, as they will best fit his Purpose.

But, without relying either on his Word or Oath, I believe we may pretty safely depend upon his old Age (a very improper Season, as Sir *William Temple* observes, for Hero's to undertake great Enterprizes in) his harrass'd Country, and the infancy of his Successor, that we shall hardly have any fresh Disturbances from *France*, during this Old King's Reign. Therefore here his Consequence, drawn from this very distant Promise, fails him: But I am satisfy'd, were I now in Conversation with him, he would, through all these Improbabilities, put me the Case of the bare Possibility of the King of *France*'s preferring the Pretender's Interest to his own, and ask me, Whether that ought not to be provided against? Why, if such remote Fears are to be satisfy'd, an easie Remedy might be found for them too, without exposing our selves to the Hazards and Mischiefs above described: A Foreign Guarranty, strictly confined to the opposing any Foreign Force, that should offer to intermeddle in the settling of our Succession, would have been a sufficient Remedy against that Evil; and the Pains and Penalties of High Treason, are a sufficient Guarranty against any Seditions or Conspiracies of a few Jacobites: And I hope all the Powers of *Europe* will be a Counter-Guarranty to one another, that no Foreign Force whatsoever shall ever have the liberty of imposing any King whatsoever, upon the Free People of Great Britain.

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The next thing advanced by the Vindicator, that can be taken into any sort of Consideration, is, Page 12. That *no Alliance is so useful to us, in order to secure the P——t S——n, as that of the States-Général*, whether we consider their Situation, Strength, Religion or Interest. As to their Situation and Strength, I shall readily own, that they are our near Neighbours, and that they are grown from a low and late Obscurity to be a very considerable People; that they are very proper and able, at any time when they will be willing, to give us a very powerful Assistance in any Affair where we may want it: But what does all this prove? Not, I hope, that we did want it in this Particular, nor in the manner, at least, they were pleased to grant it; and the greatness of their Power, instead of being an Argument in favour of this Treaty, is no bad Reason against their ever being made the Umpire of our Quarrels, if we were to have any. As to their Religion and Interest, I have but little to say to them, only that if they happen to Clash, I believe I know which will get the better. I have heard that in the Indies a *Dutchman* has been reckoned a better Title than a *Christian*; and that the best and most professed Religion in *Holland* is *Calvinistical alias Presbyterian*, tho' they are never angry with any one for liking the *Papish* or even *Mahometan* better, so that we should not depend upon their entring very far into a Quarrel for us upon that account; and as for their Interest, I believe they both know it and love it so well, that they will go with us as far, upon that score, as they themselves are Gainers by it, without any Treaty at all, and not one jot further, bind them in whatsoever you can think of.

His

His next is a pretty bold Stroak indeed, for p. 13, and 14, he undertakes to prove, that the *Dutch* ought not to be reckoned our Rivals in Trade ; and if we will but shake Hands and be Friends with them, he is sure they *will not* be so ; indeed, his Modesty will not suffer him to say, they *have not* been so, because the Loss of our Spice Trade in the *East Indies*, the Encroachments on our Settlements on the Coasts of *Africa*, and the constant Undermining us in almost every other Branch of our Trades to all Parts of the World, would have star'd him too full in the Face ; and I think we may as well form our Judgments of what *will be*, from what *has been*, as take his Word for it.

P. 15. He endeavours to invalidate the Objection made against this Treaty, ' That it is a diminution to the Independency of the Crown of *Great Britain* to call for help to her Neighbours, for the Execution of her Laws, and Confirmation of her Succession ' . And this he does by two ways : The first is, Point Blank denying that the *Dutch* are called upon to see our Laws executed, or Succession confirmed : The other way is by evading it, and shuffling off to his old shelter of calling it no more than a Defensive Alliance against *France*. The best of it is, that every body who can read and construe plain *English*, need only read the 2d Article of the Treaty, and he will find That a sufficient Answer to both his ways of Arguing. It begins, ' The Succession to the Crown of *England* having been settled by an Act of Parliament passed, &c. and ends, The States General engage to assist and maintain, in the said Succession, Her or Him to whom it shall belong, by Virtue of the said Acts of Parliament ' . If this

this be not engaging to see Acts of Parliament executed, and the Succession confirmed, I shall be glad to learn of him, what is, but till I do, I must take this for such.

He overshoots himself grossly in the next Argument he produces, p. 18. in favour of this Treaty, *viz.* The Sense of both Houses of Parliament, as he calls it, in their Address of the 3d of March 1708, 9. for in it they expressly desire the QUEEN, at the conclusion of the War, to provide for those things, which this Treaty has so illy taken care of, before the conclusion of the War.

The last Point, in relation to this part of the Treaty, consider'd by him, is the Objection made, ' That the Dutch, for their own sakes, must have supported the Protestant Succession, without being bound to it by a particular Treaty.' And here I own myself at a Loss how to form any Judgment at all, or which side of this Question to take, unless I knew what Opinions the Dutch may have of the Successor himself; if they should conceive him to be a weak or an obstinate Prince, that would put himself at the head of a weak Party, and the whole Nation into a Flame and Combustion; or if they should think his Title a weak Title, and that the Crown will set tottering on his Head, and want their Support to keep it steady; I take it, it would be then, their Interest to espouse his: But if they believe him a prudent, wise Prince, that will set himself at the head of the True Church Interest, and be steady in preserving the Rights of the Crown, without hurting the Liberties of the People, I don't doubt but they had rather see the young Gentleman from St. Germans upon the Throne, whose Religion would always make

make him suspected and uneasy to the People; for notwithstanding the *Cont* of our Interests being mutual and inseparable, there can be no doubt but the *Dutch* would always be glad to have the Kings of *England* in their Leading-strings, but which of the Two they think most fit for that purpose, is beyond my reach to be able to determine; therefore leaving *Myn Heer* to consider for himself, I think I have now done with that part of the Book that relates to the Succession, and shall now proceed, whether his *Barrier* is any better defended.

But here I cannot promise to follow him so close, almost Page by Page, as I hitherto have done, because he himself, from P. 21. to P. 36. is only fighting with the Air, and bringing Instances from *Philip de Comines*, *Queen Elizabeth*, *Monsieur Jeannin*, and the *Sense* of King *Charles the Second's* Parliaments, to prove what no Body that I know of does deny; That 'tis the true Interest of *England*, that there should be a good and sufficient *Barrier* against *France* on the side of the *Netherlands*; and if he is as fond of multiplicity of Subscriptions, as he seems to be of Quotations, I believe he might get all Sides, *Whig*, *Tory*, *Republican* and *Jacobite*, to set their Hands to it, That whilst *Holland* continues above Water, neither that nor the *Netherlands* should be suffer'd to be made an Addition to the Dominions of *France*; therefore allowing this, which when allow'd is very little to his Purpose, I shall pass on to his next Position, P. 37. which if he could make out with as much Ease as with Confidence he lays it down, would be to his Purpose indeed, That no *Barrier* can be a good and sufficient *Barrier*, that is not at least equal to that stipulated for in the *Barrier Treaty*. But here I find him at his

old

old sport of evading again, and not producing *All* or perhaps one Quarter of *What* was stipulated for in this *Barrier-Treaty*. In his Scheme of what Towns have been made the Barrier in several past Treaties, he gives us a *List of the Towns specified by Name* in this *Barrier-Treaty*, but he cunningly and industriously omits to make the least mention of *what was farther Stipulated for*, viz. in the 6th Article. Besides the Towns particularly named, they were to have *All other which shall from henceforward be Conquer'd from France*: And by the 4th, *We are to endeavour to Conquer as many other Towns and Forts as we can, in order to their being a Barrier for the Lords the States*. And Article the 5th, 'the Queen is to endeavour in the Treaty of Peace, that *All the Spanish Low Countries, and what else shall be found necessary of Conquer'd or Unconquer'd Places, shall serve as a Barrier to the States*. Do not these general Terms import ten times more than what is particularly and expressly mentioned? Can any Man say, if the 4th Article was strictly to be observ'd, how far their Barrier was to be extended, or when the War was to be at an end? Or if the 5th was closely to be pursued, can any Man say what would have satisfied a *Dutch Avarice*, or how large the Demand would have been, before they had own'd they had got *All that was thought necessary*? *Paris* or even *Grenoble*, indeed, might not have concluded a *Barrier* stipulated for in such loose and general Terms.

The *Vindictive* could not help foreseeing a very natural Argument would arise in *Condemnation* of this prodigal way of our promising Countries not only out of our Possession, but indeed out of our Reach too, which is, that the

Dutch (tho' the whole *Gertruydenburg* Treaty was under their Management) had not thought fit to ask near so much for themselves, neither in General nor in the Particulars, in the Preliminaries they offer'd there but the Year before, and therefore very modestly, *Page 59.* to support his own Absurdities, he calls all his dear Friends and Allies point blank Fools; that when *France* was reduc'd so low that she was willing to give any thing they should think proper to ask, they knew their own Interest so little, as to ask what would have done them no good when it was granted them. For my part I confess my self no Soldier, nor Statesman neither, but I am apt to believe the *Dutch* have amongst them, of both Sorts, at least as good as the *Vindicator*; and I doubt not but it was upon a serious Consultation of both, that this *single Line of Towns*, which *He* so much despises, was by *Them* then thought a *good and sufficient Barrier*: However I think we may as *safely* rely upon the *united Wisdom* of the *States*, as the *single Opinion* of our own *Countryman*, and whatever else *He* may please to call them, I would advise him, for the Credit of his own *Sense*, never to attempt to prove them Fools.

Page 63. Imagining All he lays down to be taken *pro confesso*, having *en passant* laid the Charge of breaking off the *Gertruydenburg* Treaty to the Insincerity of the *French* (tho' whoever will give himself the trouble of reading the Letters between my Lord *T——d* and Mr. Secretary *B——le*, and the Remarks upon them, will plainly find 'twas this *Barrier-Treaty*, and not the *French*, that obstructed the *Peace* in 1709), he goes on in justification of the *Barrier*, by comparing it with the *Pyrenean Treaty*, and that he proves

proves ought to be the Standard we ought to reduce the *French* Power to, by an Address made to King *Charles* the Second by the Parliament, *January 31. 1708*; wherein they express their Desire that the King of *France* might be reduced at least to that Treaty. How much weight this Address may have with other People I know not, but I must confess with me it has very little, and I believe will have with very few, who will consider the Time when it was made; 'twas at a time when the Nation was running Mad with Dr. *Oates*'s Plot, and Faction ran as high both in Parliament and without Doors, as ever that fatal Time when both Church and Crown suffer'd under it: And indeed this Address, which in 1678. desir'd King *Charles* to reduce the King of *France*, *at least*, to the Foot of the *Pyrenean* Treaty, seems to me to be of the same Stamp with that which in 1709. desired Queen *Anne* not to make Peace till she had obtain'd the *whole Spanish Monarchy to the House of Austria*; and without doubt the meaning of both was, to plunge the Crown into what they were sure would prove endless Wars, and consequently into inextricable Difficulties; the Formers of both well knowing, that when the Crown is fallen into such Distress, that they must be beholden to a Parliament to get them out of it, the King becomes the Servant, and the Parliament may Lord it over him at Will and Pleasure; and had the Desire of either of these Addresses been too long and too strictly pursued, 'tis more than possible both the Son and Granddaughter might have shared their Royal Ancestors Fate; and 'twill not be much more for the Vindicator's Honour, than 'tis to his Purpose, to insist too much upon it.

His Scheme, *Page 68 and 69.* can have no other animadverting upon it, than what is above, that it gives but a very imperfect View of the Treaty, because there is a vast deal more stipulated for in the general Terms, than what is there mention'd in the Particulars.

P. 70. He peremptorily lays it down, That *the Barrier can only be defended by committing the Defence of it to the States.* Which is what will not be so readily allow'd him as he imagines; for tho' I shall not endeavour to prove that they are no ways proper to be made the Trustees (and the Trust may at last perhaps be lodged with them) yet I can by no means allow *the Necessity* of making them so. I am able to find out another Expedient besides any he has mention'd, and if I can find One, surely they at the Helm may know a Thousand. I agree along with him, in not trusting it to Paper-Securities, Treaties, and Defensive Alliances; I can readily own the House of *Austria* never have, and if committed to their Care again, never would, I believe, defend it as it ought to be, and that *England* ought to be so cautious of a Standing Army, so much within Call, as to decline the undertaking it with Troops under her own Pay; yet all this does not prove an absolute Necessity of our giving the Defence of this Barrier wholly to the *Dutch.* Her Majesty, with the Emperor, as I said above, may perhaps think fit to repose this mighty Trust in them, (and whatever She shall do ought readily to be acquiesced in) but without doubt other ways might be found out, whereby the Towns might be both as well Garrison'd, and provided for, as if committed to the sole Care of the States. There has been ever since the Battle of *Ramillies*, and

and is yet subsisting, a joint Commission of English and Dutch, for the Administration of the Civil Government of our new Conquests in the Netherlands, why might not the same, or another of the same Nature, subsist there in time of Peace, to take care of the Revenues arising out of those Countries, and apply them to the Use of those Garrisons whereof the Barrier is to subsist ? Such a Commission at Ghent or Brussels might certainly take the same care, in every respect, of the Barrier, as a Committee of States can do at the Hague; and this would keep the Barrier equally secure against France, and more safe against any Encroachments may be made upon our Flemish Trade: Besides, since, as the Vindicator all along insists, the Barrier is of equal Use to us as 'tis to the Dutch, why should not we have a share of the Trouble of defending it ?

However, to go along with my Author, he having given the Defence of it to the Dutch, p. 79. alledges, ' That they ought to have a free Communication with it. This I think may be allow'd to be pretty reasonable ; but when he comes but to one Page further, p. 80. he begins to be very unreasonable again ; for he will by no means allow, that the States can be secure of a free Communication to their Barrier, ' if the Emperor, tho' an Ally, and tho' he should declare in never so solemn a Manner, ' their Interest to be inseparable from his, should ' have but one or two Garrisons in the mid- ' way. Why, what an unconscionable Man is here to deal with ? he asserts one Minute, that 'tis very fair, equitable and reasonable, that the Emperor should trust the Dutch to Garrison 30 or 40 strong Towns in his Country, without his

his having an Oath, or so much as a Promise from them, that they will make no ill Use of them; and at the same time won't allow the poor Emperor to keep a Garrison or two of his own, tho' he should swear himself black in the Face, that he neither intends nor ever will do them any Mischief with them: Indeed, a Mouth that blows Hot and Cold so very fast, ought to be turned out for a Wrangler.

The Position he lays down, p. 83. is again of that Sort as may be agreed to, but I cannot see what it is to his Purpose: ' That 'tis reasonable that the Country of the Barrier should contribute towards the Charge of maintaining it'. Indeed I can still go further and own, That if they were to bear the whole Burden of it, I do not see the great Injustice done them; for if by a strong Barrier well defended, they can make it difficult and impracticable for their Country to be made the Seat of War, I believe their Estates, when charg'd with the necessary Duties for maintaining it, would be worth double the Value that any present Possessor has ever known of them; and perhaps they would have as little Cause to complain of the Whole, if raised by the most prudent and gentle Methods, as they may of their Contribution towards it, exacted by a Dutch Military and a German Civil Government.

In a Page or two further he grows extreamly pleasant; for having talk'd so long of the Reasonableness of it, he is got, p. 85. to calling it an ' Absolute Right that the Dutch had to a sufficient Batrier in the Netherlands, and to have themselves the Defence of it, previous to the Barrier Treaty: And That Right, he says, they have acquired by what they have done

done and suffered for them for forty Years together, which has cost them more than the whole Country is worth, if it were to be Sold. I am afraid he is hardly in earnest here, or I could rather wish he could make out this to be true Logick, because then by the same reason, I am sure we could produce an indisputable Title to *Holland* and the rest of the *United Provinces*, by what we have done and suffered for them for above hundred Years ; and considering both Countries, I am sure if the *Dutch* have paid the value of the *Netherlands* once, we have paid the value of the *United Provinces* ten times over.

P. 86. The next Title upon which he founds this Right of theirs is, the Grand Alliance ; but this is a Thistle he mumbles so very much, 'tis plain he cannot very well digest it himself ; he quotes indeed both the *Latin* and *French* Articles of it, but to no other purpose, that I can find, but to make his Female Readers believe he's a fine Gentleman, and understands the Languages ; tho' by his Construing them he seems to expect, they should not be able to understand plain *English*, for even by his own Construction they make against him ; and those who are very solicitous about this Point, if they will take the Pains to understand 'em, may be convinced by the Vindicator's own Quotations, and those that are not, may take my Word for it, that the *Dutch* have not so reasonable Hopes given them by any Article of the Grand Alliance of *being put into Possession* of the Barrier in the *Netherlands*, as they had of putting themselves into Possession of *Great Britain*, by the Barrier Treaty.

P. 92. His next Claim of Right for them is, from a Memorial given in by the States to Count *d'Avaux* in 1701. and this is a pretty extraordinary one indeed: Here he gives them a Right to a very large Demand, because in 1701, they thought fit to make a small one, because they then ask'd a few Towns, scarce half in number, and not of half the Significance with those mentioned in the Barrier Treaty, they have therefore now a Right not only to all the Towns specify'd in it, but to whatever else they shall think necessary: Besides, he forgets several other material Differences; the Towns now necessary for free Communication, at least *Ghent*, was not then thought so, at least not ask'd for: In that Memorial the Forces of *Spain*, or of *Great Britain*, if thought fit, were allowed to be reasonable to be left in any of the Garrisons of *Flanders*, tho' the Emperor is to be kick'd out of all of them by this Treaty: Nor is there one Word in it, of the four hundred thousand *Crowns a Year*, besides the Revenues of those Countries Conquered and to be Conquered from *France*, that were not in Possession of the *Crown of Spain* at the time of the last King's Death, tho' all this is now thought too little. This Argument from the Memorial therefore, might certainly as well have been let alone.

P. 104. He tells us, ' That the States having a Barrier, pursuant to the present Treaty, is far from exposing us to any Danger from them. And why d'ye think so? ' Because, to attempt any thing in prejudice to our Trade, would be a violation of the Treaty: That is, in other *English*, if they do hurt us, they don't play fair, for we have made our Bargain otherwise; this may be very good Child's Play, but 'tis

the Devil of a National Security : But again, he says, ' They cannot do it without an open Rupture with us ; but I say, if we may argue from what has been, or what now is, upon what may be, this is amongst the number of his Assertions which are not to be allow'd true in Fact ; for I can give him both ancient and modern Instances of our Trade being both Injured and Undermined by them, without any Rupture following upon it that ever I heard of. In the Year 1619, King James the First struck up a Solemn League with them, whereby the *English* and *Dutch East-India Companies* were jointly and amicably to carry on that Trade : Within three Years after, in the midst of our new Amity, in 1622, the *Dutch* being suffered to intermix in our Colonies by virtue of that League, in the most Treacherous Manner possible, surpriz'd us at *Amboyna*, and not only committed the most barbarous and inhuman Cruelties upon our Countrymen there, but expelled us from thence, and almost Forty more, then flourishing Settlements in those Countries, robbed us of our Spice and several other profitable Trades there, and yet no *Dutch War*, that ever I heard of, attended it : This very Treaty by which (to our loss) we were to be put upon an equal foot of Trade to *Spain* and the *Spanish Dominions*, was sealed but in *October 1709*, and in the very beginning of the Month following, *November 7. 1709*, before the Wax was well cold, they came to a Resolution, and in *October 1710*, made an *Ordinance*, That the Duties on their own Goods going to and coming from the New Conquests should be taken off, by which we now Trade thither 8*l.* per Cent. dearer than the *Dutch*, and yet we are

so far from coming to a Rupture with them about it, that we are now taking more than necessary Pains, in courting them not to be Blind and Obstinate against their own Welfare.

But, P. 105. we are told, *They are to have the Military Command only, and not the Power of Imposing Duties, &c.* Yet, I believe, most People will agree with me, that if they are in Possession of not only the Barrier, but all other Garrisons throughout the whole Country, the Cream of the Civil Revenues allotted to them by this Treaty, and the rest Mortgaged to them before, 'tis no great stretch to say, they have the *Power of doing* whatever they, in their own Judgments, shall think was for their own Interest; and we shall be more beholding to their good Will than want of *Power*, if they do not make any Alterations or Regulations of Trade whatever; and how far 'tis prudent to trust to their good Nature, in such a Case, I need not take upon me to declare: But this, the precedent, and two following Arguments, all depending upon the Validity of this Treaty, and the Declaration of the States, I hope he will give me leave to answer them all with one I learn'd from himself, P. 70, and P. 80. (where he will allow of no Treaties with *France*, or the most solemn Declaration from the E——r, to be of any significance) *viz.* That no *Paper-Securities* are *Real ones*; and, if so, I am sure neither this Treaty, nor the Declaration of the States, ought to be depended upon.

But he offers a collateral Security as to our Trade, and that no less than the E——r's, for he tells us, P. 107. *That the Dutch cannot obstruct our Trade without breaking with the E——r*. However I hope he will allow, that if they should take upon them to obstruct our Trade, *they*

they need not therefore break with the Emperor, unless he will, upon that account, break with them : And I am afraid (tho' if the Subject of the Quarrel were gaining Acquisitions to the Empire, or the whole *Spanish Monarchy* to the House of *Austria*, he would readily draw his Sword and never know when he had fighting enough) that if we were to depend over much upon a *German* *Resentment* about *Trade*, we should find our selves leaning upon a broken Reed, and instead of Support we should get only bloody Fingers.

I hope he will forgive my passing over his Observations on the Representation of the Merchants of *Bruges*, and leaving that to speak for it self ; he must pardon me too, if I think his Argument, P. 118 and 120. ‘ That it will be more the Interest of the States than ever to avoid breaking with us, when the Barrier is put into their Hands, because the King of *France* will be then so terribly angry with them for undertaking it,’ is so very Trifling and Childish, that I think it deserves no Answer. And as to his Computation, That the whole Revenue of the *Spanish Netherlands*, is not sufficient to maintain the Barrier, P. 122. he must pardon me too, if after having found so much Insincerity throughout his whole Book, I do not take his Word for it.

P. 127. He undertakes to answer what he calls the great Objection to this Treaty, viz. ‘ That it is highly prejudicial to the Commerce of *Great Britain*, to submit our Trade in the *Spanish Dominions* to an Equality with that of *Holland*.’ And he takes a great deal of Pains to prove, they had a Right to such an Equality of Trade, from some Articles of their

first twelve Years Truce with *Spain*, their Treaty of Peace with *Spain* made at *Munster* 1648, and the Grand Alliance, all which I shall take into Consideration, and put them in a true Light: And I doubt not but to satisfy every impartial Reader, First, That whatever Right of that sort they might lay a Claim to, by virtue of any Treaties of their Own with the Crown of *Spain*, the Crown of *England* had no ways before made her self a Guaranty to it, and consequently was no ways obliged to acknowledge or support them in it: And, Secondly, That in Fact, notwithstanding any Treaties the *Dutch* may have obtained, in favour of themselves, there always has been a distinction made in favour of the *English* Merchants Trading to *Spain* and the Spanish Dominions, beyond whatever has been allow'd to the *Dutch*; and this being prov'd, I think the Vindicator will have fail'd as much in his Defence of this part of the Treaty, as he has in the rest. To go along with him then through all his Treaties, 'twill not be immaterial to take notice of the Time when, and the Parties by whom they were all made. The first is the twelve Years Truce, which tho' I have never seen, I will suppose for once, to be truly quoted; and that by the 7th Article of it, the *Dutch* Trade and Ours were put upon an equal Foot: Let us consider the Time when this was made; it was in their very Infancy, when they call'd themselves, and really were, *The Poor Distressed States*, hitherto weak and unable to support themselves: They had lain a dead Weight upon us, and 'twas now time to shake off the Burden from our own Shoulders, and endeavour to make them stand upon their own Legs:

Legs: No wonder therefore that we were then willing that they might gain as much Strength, as was possible, from a twelve Years Trade; and therefore then endeavour'd to procure for them all the Advantages we possibly could, especially for such a Term of Years; but whatever Advantages were then thought reasonable, and actually were then obtained by Us and *France* for them, they are long since expired and gone, by the expiration of that Truce, as much as if it never had been in Being, and we are no ways obliged to take any further notice of it, than in Gratitude for the good Offices they have since done Us. The next is a Treaty made at *Munster*, Anno 1648. This was a Treaty made entirely between *Spain* and Them, as to us at least, because as you have justly observ'd, 'twas Sign'd when *England* had no Crown, but on or near that fatal Day was struck off the Head of the Royal Martyr; so that 'tis impossible We could be made a Party to it, and therefore That could be no ways binding to Us: And he himself does not mention any other Treaty made since, (and therefore I may fairly suppose there is none) by which the Crown has any ways made it self a Guarranty to it, till we come down to the Grand Alliance in 1701: And how far this can be made out to be a Guarranty to it, I must own I do not directly know, because I have not seen it, any more than either of the other two; but in hearing the Words of it often controverted, I was always of Opinion no such thing could be fairly imply'd from it; but if there can, the more the Shame for him that made it; 'twould be enough to make one sick of Foreigners for Kings, if it be true, That a Dutch

Man,

Man, whilst an *English* King, did bind the Crown to hurt the Priviledges in Trade of his own Subjects, in favour of his own Countrymen.

The next and last Thing to be considered is, Whether the *English* Merchants did, in *Fact*, enjoy greater Priviledges in *Spain* and the *Spanish* Dominions, than the *Dutch*? The Vindicator says, No: And his single Support is from a Letter of Sir *William Hodges*. I suppose the Assertion to be true, by the Testimony of other *Spanish* Merchants of equal Experience and Reputation with Sir *William*; I mean not this as any Reflection upon him, but think both he and they may be honest Gentlemen, tho' they differ Diametrically in their Evidence as to this Fact: Each of them speaks, I dare say, what lies in the compass of their own Knowledge, and, as far as that reaches, true: How stands the Fact then? Here is one experienc'd *Spanish* Merchant says, He never knew or heard of any Difference of Priviledges in Trade between Us and the *Dutch*; and here are others, that in the Face of Five hundred Gentlemen (several of which were *Spanish* Merchants too) assert, That there always were Differences made in favour of the *English*, and that to their own knowledge, and when ask'd, specify what the particular Priviledges were. Upon the whole Evidence, 'tis easie to determine on which side the Verdict must be given.

And now I have gone through this so much celebrated Pamphlet, and I think have not left any one Argument or Position in it unattack'd, nor I hope unanswer'd; and tho' you, Sir, had before sufficiently exposed the Author to all, who, like your self, were able to take his whole Scope

Scope into one View, and perceive where every Lash you gave him took Place ; yet, as there are many inferior Capacities and florer Jndgments, that might be deluded into a favourable Opinion of this abominable Treaty, I have for their sakes, and the sake of Truth, taken more pains than ever I thought would have come to my Share in this way, for Writing is by no means my Talent ; and, tho' I think I have been able to detect the Vindicator in his Fallacies, Triflings, and false Reasonings, yet I must own, as I would not, if I could, impose upon the World, so much as he has endeavour'd to do ; so I could not if I would command so easie, fluent, and deceitful a Style, as his is, or even in a good Cause make Truth appear so like her self, as He hath been able to many Falshoods appear like Truth : However, if I have been able to point out the ill Things contained in the Barrier Treaty (they are sufficiently Blazon'd by you) and expose the Weakness of their Champion, I have my Ends : I desire not the Reputation, which I should not be able to maintain, of an Author, but shall be always proud of being,

SIR,

Your very humble Servant.

FINIS.